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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY I 
OF AMERICA, a corporation, I 
Plaintijf-Respondent, I 
vs. I 
CARNICERO DYNASTY 
CORPORATION, a corporation; I Case No. 
WENDELL L. BUTCHER; IRENE > 13836 
B. BUTCHER; CHRIS L. / 
STANFIELD; JANIS B. 
STANFIELD, BEN D. ISAAC; I 
and LILA O. ISAAC, 1 
Defendants-Appellants. \ 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Suit by bonding company against alleged indem-
nitor who signed indemnity agreement after bond had 
been issued. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
District Court refused amendment to assert defense 
of lack of consideration and awarded judgment against 
indemnitor for $44,600.00. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Order reversing judgment and dismissing case as 
to defendants Butcher, or in the alternative remanding 
the case for a new trial. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff (a bonding company) obtained general 
indemnity agreements from defendants Stanfields and 
Isaacs (Nov. 1968) the officers of defendant Carnicero 
(a contractor), (Ex. 2-P). No indemnity agreement was 
asked for or received from defendants Butcher at that 
time. (R, 120, par. 4; 376, lines 20-24). Thereafter plain-
tiff issued a bid bond (R. 382) and payment and per-
formance bonds (Jan. 6, 1969 - Ex. 4-P, R. 353) for Car-
nicero in connection with the construction of a post of-
fice. Over four months later plaintiff requested and re-
ceived an indemnity agreement (Ex. 1-P) from defen-
dants Butcher (R. 299-302; 359; 376-387) (who was prop-
erty manager of Carnicero, but was not an officer, di-
rector or stockholder of that organization) (R. 270-271). 
At the time when Butchers executed the indemnity 
agreement (Ex. 1-P) the plaintiff had already issued 
the bond (Ex. 4-P) and was legally bound to third 
parties thereon (R. 371, 380, 382). Plaintiff gave no con-
sideration for the Butcher indemnity agreement and did 
not change it's position in reliance upon that agreement, 
(R. 120). 
At the conclusions of the evidence the Court sum-
marized the evidence concerning the Butcher indemnity 
agreement in part as follows (R. 417): 
". . . More than four months after the bond is issued, 
. . . after presumably an application for a bid bond 
is made and a bid bond issued, the Indemnity Agree-
ment obtained from the others and from the cor-
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poration and the bid awarded and the bonds are 
issued. After all of that takes place, the insurance 
company as an obvious afterthought, goes out 
through their agent Mills, and he gets the signature 
of Mr. & Mrs. Butcher on that type of an Indemnity 
Agreement. 
Now, the defense that Mr. Barker raises here is 
lack of consideration. . . ." (emphasis added) 
Butcher did not recall that his indemnity agreement 
was signed after the bond had been issued (R. 212), was 
not aware that the indemnity agreement was unenforce-
able for lack of consideration, did not disclose those facts 
to his attorney, (R, 421) who accordingly did not assert 
lack of consideration as a defense in their answer. But-
chers' attorney first became aware that the Butcher in-
demnity agreement lacked consideration when the in-
demnity agreement (Ex. 1-P) and the bond (Ex. 4-P) 
were placed into evidence by plaintiff during the trial 
(R. 421). Butchers then moved the Court for dismissal 
of plaintiff's complaint since the indemnity agreement 
upon which the suit is based was not supported by con-
sideration (R. 410, 417-421), and to amend their answer 
to conform to the evidence adduced by plaintiff at the 
trial, to assert the defense of lack of consideration (R. 
122, 418-421). At the request of the Court briefs were 
submitted by plaintiff (R. 131-146) and by Butchers (R. 
122-130), and thereafter the Court entered a memoran-
dum decision denying Butchers' motions and awarding 
judgment against Butchers (R. 147-149). 
The Court's refusal to permit Butchers to assert the 
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defense of lack of consideration appears to be grounded 
on the fact that a careful reading of plaintiff's answers 
to Butchers' interrogatories and the exhibits attached 
thereto would have disclosed that the defense of lack of 
consideration was available to Butchers (R. 148) four 
months before trial, but that since Butchers failed to 
observe that fact and to make a motion to amend during 
the four months between the time when plaintiff an-
swered Butchers' interrogatories and the trial date, that 
plaintiff was somehow prejudiced in preparing to meet 
that issue at the trial (R. 131-146 & 148). 
Plaintiff's counsel claimed that he was prejudiced in 
meeting the absence of consideration defense because 
of the long period of time that passed between com-
mencement of the lawsuit and trial, and argued that 
evidence which might have been available to meet that 
issue, had it been raised earlier, was not available at time 
of trial (R. 141, 144-145), claiming that an employee of 
plaintiffs Denver office had left their employ, and that 
the local agent of plaintiff had destroyed his files. How-
ever, plaintiff's witnesses (Mills, the agent who wrote 
the bond) established that three or four different people 
in the Denver office worked on the bond involved in this 
case, that whoever happened to be in when he called 
would pull the file and help him, that there was no con-
tinuity or follow through by a particular employee in 
issuing the bond (R, 382-384), and that the local agent 
(Mills) knew in 1970 that there were problems with the 
bond (R. 383), but that he did not keep his files since 
"The company has copies of everything." The long de-
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lay in bringing this matter to trial was the fault of plain-
tiff who for almost two years failed to request a trial 
date (R. 47) and failed to respond to discovery (R. 61, 
67, 69, 70), which resulted in cancellation of four sched-
uled trial dates, (R. 48, 67, 70, 72-74, 77, 110). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BUTCHERS HAVE NEVER BEEN LEGALLY BOUND 
TO INDEMNIFY PLAINTIFF 
Since plaintiff was bound on it's bond before it ob-
tained Butchers' signatures on the indemnity agreement 
and since plaintiff gave no consideration for that indem-
nity agreement, Butchers never became contracturally 
obligated to indemnify plaintiff for it's losses on the 
Carnicero bond. A promise of indemnity is void for want 
of consideration where made after the execution of the 
sureties' undertaking. Thompson v. Moe, 265 P. 457 
(Wash); O'Neill v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 
172 P. 306, 51 U. 592; Manwell v. Oyler, 361 P.2d 177, 11 
U2d 433, Latimer v. Holladay, 134 P.2d 183, 103 U. 152. 47 
Am Jur 2d Suretyship, Sec. 229, Page 153; Jones v. 
Shorter, 1 Ga. 294; Vansant v. Gardner, 240 Ky 318, 42 
SW2d 300; 17 Am Jur 2d Contracts, Sec. 86, 397. 
There can be no contract where consideration is 
lacking. This differs from failure of consideration where 
there was in fact a contract but the promised perfor-
mance fails. Williston, Contracts, 3d ed Sec. 119A. A 
determination of this matter on the merits would be a 
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holding that Butchers are not now and never have been 
liable to plaintiff. To hold Butchers liable would be to 
confer a windfall upon plaintiff who wrote the bond, 
accepted a premium for the bond, and became contrac-
t u a l l y obligated on the bond without any guarantee or 
agreement from Butchers. (R. 371, 380, 382). If plain-
tiff is denied recovery against Butchers it will be in no 
worse position that it was in at the time that it accepted 
the premium and wrote the bond. Plaintiff has not 
changed it's position or parted with anything of value 
in exchange for the Butcher indemnity agreement and it 
would be unconscionable to shift plaintiff's loss (which 
it assumed in exchange for a premium) to Butchers who 
received no benefit or consideration for the execution of 
the indemnity agreement. 
It would have been better business judgment for the 
plaintiff to have required additional security before 
electing to issue the bond, but having made a business 
judgment to issue the bond without additional security 
the plaintiff is now bound by that decision and should be 
limited to recovery on the security which it bargained 
for in exchange for the bond. 
Even if Butchers had paid plaintiff the amounts 
claimed to be due under the Butcher indemnity agree-
ment, Butchers would have been entitled to recover 
those payments back from plaintiff upon discovery of 
the fact that the indemnity agreement was not supported 
by consideration. See Restatement Security, Sec. 152 (b) 
(ii). 
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POINT II 
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO MEET IT'S BURDEN OF 
PROOF AGAINST BUTCHERS 
Plaintiff incorrectly alleged in it's complaint (with-
out pleading dates) that the bond was issued in consid-
eration of the Butcher indemnity agreement (R.3). But-
chers did not recall and their attorney did not become 
aware that the indemnity agreement was executed after 
the bond was issued until plaintiff placed them in evi-
dence at the trial, (R. 212, 421), and accordingly in their 
answer Butcher did not deny plaintiffs incorrect allega-
tions of consideration. (R, 8-9). 
Plaintiff's pleadings and defendants' failure to deny 
established a prima-facia case against Butchers until the 
evidence which plaintiff itself introduced (bond, ex. 4-p 
and indemnity agreement, ex. 1-p) superseded the gen-
eral allegations of consideration contained in plaintiff's 
pleadings, and established conclusively that plaintiff was 
not entitled to recover against Butchers because the con-
tract relied upon by plaintiff in it's lawsuit (Ex. 1-P) 
was void and unenforceable since not supported by con-
sideration. 
Plaintiff simply introduced evidence which estab-
lished conclusively that it was not entitled to recover 
against Butcher. The fact that Butchers or their attorney 
might have learned that the contract lacked consider-
ation earlier so as to have alleged that defense in their 
answer, by an amendment to their answer, by motion, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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etc. does not change the basic fact that Butchers are 
not now and never were bound on the contract of in-
demnity, nor change the fact that plaintiff itself pro-
duced the evidence which conclusively established that 
plaintiff had not met it's burden of proving that it was 
entitled to a judgment against Butchers. 
The burden of proof of all elements necessary to 
establish it's case was upon plaintiff. Had plaintiff relied 
upon the failure of Butchers to deny consideration and 
had it not introduced evidence which disproved the false 
consideration allegation in plaintiff's complaint, the 
plaintiff would have been entitled to win. Having 
elected to produce documents into evidence which dis-
proved their general allegations of consideration, plain-
tiff is bound by those documents. The risk of non-per-
suasion never shifts from plaintiff as to proof of the 
essential elements of it's claim, including the element 
of consideration. Plaintiff prima facia satisfied it's bur-
den of proof by Butchers failure to deny that the con-
tract was supported by consideration, however that 
prima facia satisfaction of the burden of proof was over-
come by direct evidence, and that direct evidence also 
conclusively established that plaintiff had not met it's 
risk of non-persuasion (whcih never shifts from plain-
tiff). See Kartchner v. Home, 262 P.2d 749, 1 U.2d 112; 
In re Swan's Estate, 293 P.2d 682, 4 U.2d 277; Peoples 
Finance & Thrift Co. v. Landes, 503 P.2d 444, 28 U.2d 
392; 29 Am Jur 2d Evidence, Sec. 123, 124, 125, 126, 128, 
130, 142. 
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It is important to clearly distinguish the difference 
between an absence of consideration and a failure of con-
sideration. Where this is no consideration there can be 
no contract, but where there is a failure of consideration 
there is a contract when the agreement is made, but be-
cause of some supervening cause the promised perfor-
mance fails. Williston, Contracts 3d ed Sec. 119A. The 
burden of proving consideration is part of plaintiff's case, 
whereas if we were dealing with a failure of considera-
tion situation the burden would be upon Butchers to 
plead and prove failure of consideration. See Rule 8(c), 
URCP; 29 Am Jur 2d Evidence, Sec. 142. Had plaintiff 
pleaded the date of the bond and the date of the indem-
nity agreement the complaint would have contained a 
"built-in" defense and would have been insufficient to 
entitle plaintiff to recover against Butchers. See 5 
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, Sec. 
1226, 1355 and cases there cited. 
POINT III 
BUTCHERS ARE ENTITLED TO DISMISSAL UNDER 
RULE 41(b), URCP (PLAINTIFF HAS SHOWN NO 
RIGHT TO RELIEF) 
Rule 41(b), URCP, reads in part as follows: 
". . . After the plaintiff, in an action tried by the 
court without a jury, has completed the presenta-
tion of his evidence the defendant, . . . may move 
for a dismissal on ground that upon the facts and 
law the plaintiff has no right to relief. . . " (Em-
phasis added) 
Introduction of the bond (Ex. 4-P) and the Butcher 
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indemnity agreement (Ex. 1-P) disclosed that the bond 
was issued before the indemnity agreement was signed, 
and that therefore it was without consideration and was 
unenforceable. Accordingly, Butchers are entitled to 
dismissal of plaintiff's complaint against them under 
Rule 41(b), URCP, and the entry of judgment against 
them was in error and should be reversed. Gregory v. 
Denver Si Rio Grande Western R. Co., 8 U.(2d) 114, 329 
P.2d 407; Winegar v. Slim Olson, Inc., 122 U. 487, 252 
P.2d 205, 208; 76 Am Jur 2d Trial Sec. 1245. See also 
discussion under point II above distinguishing between 
absence of consideration (failure of plaintiff to sustain 
burden of proof of a valid enforceable contract) and 
failure of consideration (where a contract in fact existed 
but became unenforceable later by reason of failure of 
consideration, in which event burden of proof of failure 
of consideration is imposed upon defendant.) See Rule 
8(c) and 12(h), URCP. 
POINT IV 
FAILURE TO DENY PLAINTIFF'S FALSE ALLEGA-
TION OF CONSIDERATION WAS NOT A WAIVER 
BY BUTCHERS OF THE DEFENSE OF ABSENCE OF 
CONSIDERATION 
A waiver is "The intentional or voluntary relin-
quishment of a known right." Black's Law Dictionary, 
revised fourth edition, and cases there cited. It is undis-
puted that at the time Butchers attorney filed their an-
swer neither he nor they were aware that the indemnity 
agreement sued upon was void for absence of consider-
ation (R. 212, 421), and that when Butchers counsel be-
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came aware of that fact he moved the court for dismissal 
of plaintiff's complaint and to amend the answer to con-
form to the evidence (R. 122, 410, 417-421). Since But-
chers were not aware of the facts necessary to know that 
consideration was absent, there could be no waiver of the 
lack of consideration defense by not raising that defense 
in the original answer. 
Plaintiff's counsel argued (R. 133) (apparently suc-
cessfully R. 147-149) to the Court that absence of con-
sideration is an affirmative defense which is waived if 
not asserted in the answer. Rule 8(c), URCP, lists var-
ious affirmative defenses which must be pleaded or they 
are deemed to be waived under Rule 12(h), URCP. One 
of the listed defenses is "failure of consideration." Fail-
ure to plead such an affirmative defense does not pre-
clude proof of such a defense at a trial in all cases. See 
Cheney v. Rucker, 14 U.(2d) 205, 381 P.2d 86. 
Counsel for plaintiff and the Court apparently failed 
to observe the distinction between absence of considera-
tion (never was an enforceable contract) and failure of 
consideration (valid contract terminated because of sub-
sequent failure of consideration). (See discussion under 
Point I above). Rule 8(c), URCP, requires an affirm-
ative allegation only where the consideration fails, not 
where the consideration was wholly absent. Zebod v. 
Hurst, 65 Okla 248, 166 P. 99, 61 Am Jur 2d Pleading 
Sec. 160. 
A denial by Butchers of the consideration allega-
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tion in plaintiff's complaint would have violated the 
letter and spirit of Rule 11, URCP, (good ground to sup-
port pleadings). Butchers should not be penalized for 
honesty in their pleadings, and plaintiff should not be 
rewarded with an undeserving judgment because But-
chers did not discover the falseness of the consideration 
allegations in plaintiff's complaint until contrary evi-
dence was produced by plaintiff during the trial. Public 
policy should favor the pleader who honestly admitted 
that which he believed to be true. To hold otherwsie 
would encourage denial of facts not really in dispute to 
avoid such pitfalls should evidence at the trial establish 
new facts as in our case. 
The allegation of consideration in plaintiff's com-
plaint was false. Plaintiff now seeks to take advantage of 
it's false pleading and it's own wrong by claiming preju-
dice because Butchers did not learn that it was false until 
trial. 
POINT V 
THE DEFENSE OF FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM 
FOR RELIEF UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANT-
ED MAY BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME AT THE 
TRIAL 
Rule 12(h), URCP, reads in part as follows: 
"A party waives all defenses and objections 
which he does not present either by motion . . . or in 
his answer . . ., except (1) that the defense of fail-
ure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
. . . may also be made by a later pleading, . . . by a 
motion for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial 
on the merits, . . . The objection or defense, if made 
at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in Rule 
15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have 
been received." (Emphasis added). 
Plaintiff's original complaint falsely stated that the 
indemnity agreement sued upon was executed in con-
sideration of issuance of the bond (which in fact had 
already been issued), and accordingly appeared to state 
a claim for relief upon which relief could have been 
granted until contrary evidence was presented by plain-
tiff (Ex. 1-P & 4-P). In plaintiff's answer to Butchers' 
interrogatories (R. 79, Par. 1(b)(3) & 92) plaintiff dis-
closed facts which, if carefully studied, would have in-
formed Butchers' counsel of the defense of absence of 
consideration (filed over a year late — about four 
months before the trial — R. 61 & 78). Plaintiff's plead-
ings were thereby amended or superseded by evidence 
of the actual facts, and it then first appeared affirmative-
ly in the record that there was in fact no consideration 
for the indemnity agreement, and that plaintiff's com-
plaint (as modified by answers to interrogatories and by 
actual evidence) did not state a claim for relief upon 
which relief could be granted. Under Rule 12 (h) , URCP, 
(quoted above), after the answers to interrogatories were 
in the record, (R. 78-106), Butchers were entitled, at 
their option, to either move to amend their answer to 
raise the defense of absence of consideration or to raise 
that defense at the trial. Butchers' counsel failed to 
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observe the facts showing lack of consideration in re-
viewing the answers to interrogatories and accordingly 
first raised the defense when plaintiff presented exhibits 
1-P and 4-P into evidence at the trial, which procedure 
is expressly authorized by Rule 12(h), URCP, (quoted 
above). Rule 12(h), URCP, directs the Court to "dispose 
of" such a defense raised for the first time at trial under 
Rule 15(b), URCP. Rule 15(b), URCP, reads in part as 
follows: 
"When issues not raised by the pleadings are 
tried by express or implied consent of the parties, 
they shall be treated in all respects as if they had 
been raised by the pleadings. Such amendment of 
the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to 
conform to the evidence and to raise these issues 
may be made upon motion of any party at any time, 
even after judgment; but failure so to amend 
does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. 
If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground 
that it is not within the issues made by the plead-
ings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amend-
ed when the presentation of the merits of the action 
will be subserved thereby and the objecting party 
fails to satisfy the court that the admission of such 
evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his 
action or defense upon the merits. The court shall 
grant a continuance, if necessary, to enable the ob-
jecting party to meet such evidence." (emphasis 
added) 
Rule 15(b), URCP, is modified by Rule 12(h), UR-
CP, (quoted above), to add the proviso that if the de-
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fense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted is raised at the trial, then that defense 
". . . shall be disposed of as provided in Rule 15(b) 
in light of any evidence that may have been re-
ceived." 
Accordingly, the defense of absence of consideration was 
properly first raised at the trial, and as provided in Rules 
12(h) and 15(b), URCP, that defense is ". . . treated 
in all respects as if they (it) had been raised by the 
pleadings/' particularly in view of the additional provi-
sion in Rule 15(b), URCP, that permits the Court to al-
low pleadings to be amended ". . . when the presentation 
of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby . . " 
A determination of this case on the merits requires a de-
termination that the indemnity agreement is void for 
absence of consideration and dismissal of plaintiff's 
claims as to Butchers. Justice requires that such an 
amendment of the pleadings be permitted. 
In Goeltz v. Continental Bank & Trust Co., 299 P.2d 
832, 5 U.(2d) 204, the Supreme Court affirmed a denial 
of a motion to amend made at the trial, allegedly to 
conform to the evidence. In that case the Court found 
that the facts upon which the defense of statute of limi-
tations was founded were well known and were pleaded, 
but that the pleading failed to assert that defense. In 
our case the facts were not known when the answer was 
filed, nor were those facts pleaded by plaintiff. In that 
case the Court also found that to defeat the plaintiff's 
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claim by the bar of the statute of limitations is not a 
determination of the case on its merits. In our case to 
defeat plaintiff's claim by reason of absence of consider-
ation is in fact a determination of the case on the merits. 
See also Meyer v. Deluke, 23 U.(2d) 74, 457 P.2d 966, 
denying amendment where facts supporting defense of 
usury were known and pleaded without pleading the de-
fense of usury. 
When plaintiff introduced the bond and indemnity 
agreement into evidence (Ex. 1-P & 4-P) showing the 
absence of consideration, plaintiff by implication con-
sented within the meaning of Rule 15(b), URCP, to a 
trial of that issue as though it had been raised by the 
pleadings and waived it's right to object to that defense 
being raised by Butchers. The material variance of the 
evidence from plaintiff's pleadings concerning consider-
ation is sufficient to justify a nonsuit. Vance v. Whalon, 
7 U. 44, 24 P. 672; 61 Am Jur 2d Sec. 366, 376 & 378. 
POINT VI 
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT PREJUDICED IN IT'S DE-
FENSE RE ABSENCE OF CONSIDERATION BY ANY 
ACT DONE BY BUTCHERS 
The evidence which established the absence of con-
sideration was received without objection from plaintiff, 
who itself presented that evidence (Ex. 1-P & Ex. 4-P). 
Rule 15 (b), URCP, imposes a duty upon a party to object 
to evidence concerning issues not raised by the plead-
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ings. Plaintiff is bound by the unfavorable aspects of 
the evidence which it produced. Ray v. Consolidated 
Freightways, 289 P.2d 196, 4 U. (2d) 137. Plaintiff can-
not now escape the legal effect of that evidence. 
Had plaintiff pleaded the date of issuance of the 
bond (Ex. 4-P) and the date of execution of the Butcher 
indemnity agreement (Ex. 1-P), then plaintiff's com-
plaint would have had a "built in" defense. (See 5 
Wright & Miller, Fed. Practices & Proc, Sec. 1226 and 
1355 and cases there cited.) Plaintiff as an expert in the 
bonding business is held to a higher standard of care 
than defendants who are lay persons who lacked infor-
mation to ascertain that the indemnity agreement was 
void, a fact which should have been known to plaintiff 
from the inception. Plaintiff was not misled by Butchers 
ignorance. 
It is true, as observed by the Court in it's memor-
andum decision (R. 148), that had counsel for Butchers 
been more astute he would have been aware of the de-
fense of absence of consideration four months before 
trial when plaintiff answered Butchers interrogatories 
(which answers were over a year late), and accordingly 
could have moved to amend to assert that defense prior 
to trial. Rule 15(b), URCP, reads in part as follows: 
". . . If evidence is objected to at the trial on the 
ground that it is not within the issues made by the 
pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be 
amended when the presentation of the merits of the 
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting 
party fails to satisfy the court that the admission 
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of such evidence would prejudice him in maintain-
ing his action or defense on the merits. The Court 
shall grant a continuance, if necessary, to enable the 
objecting party to meet such evidence." (emphasis 
added) 
Plaintiff's argument is that because the trial occur-
red 5% years after the lawsuit was commenced (R. 4 
& 112-115), since Plaintiff's local agent (Mills) has des-
troyed some of his old files, since a former employee of 
plaintiff's home office who worked on the issuance of 
the bonds involved in this lawsuit could not be located, 
and since plaintiff's attorney might have conducted fur-
ther discovery procedure had the consideration issue 
been raised earlier (in an alleged effort to learn if But-
cher had made an oral promise to become an indemnitor, 
which if established might have provided the missing 
consideration), that plaintiff is somehow prejudiced and 
Butchers should therefore be held liable on a void in-
demnity agreement (R. 131-146, 148). It is important 
to note that plaintiff does not claim that Butchers had 
notice of the availability of the absence of consideration 
defense until plaintiff answered Butchers' interroga-
tories or that they had actual notice prior to trial. Plain-
tiff does not claim that it would have been better able to 
respond to that defense had Butchers amended their an-
swer four months before trial when plaintiff finally an-
swered Butchers' interrogatories. This failure to amend 
appears to have been heavily relied upon by the Court 
in it's memorandum decision (R. 148), however since 
that failure did not prejudice plaintiff in meeting the de-
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fense of absence of consideration, failure to amend at 
that time is insufficient to justify refusal of Butchers 
motion to amend to conform to the evidence as provided 
by Rule 15(b), URCP. 
Had plaintiff diligently prosecuted this lawsuit the 
51/2 year delay before trial would not have occurred and 
the claimed prejudice would not exist. Plaintiff knew 
that there were problems with the bonded project shortly 
after the bond was issued (R. 310, 314-321 and Ex. 32DI). 
The lawsuit was commenced in June, 1969, (R. 2). It 
was almost two years later when plaintiff first requested 
a trial date (R. 47). No discovery procedure was prose-
cuted by plaintiff until July, 1972 when one deposition 
was taken, (R. 59). Plaintiff engaged in no other dis-
covery. Butchers submitted interrogatories (R. 61) 
which plaintiff did not answer for over a year (R. 78) 
and then only after repeated motions to dismiss for fail-
ure to answer (R. 67, 69, 70, 72, 74, 77, 107). Four trial 
dates were vacated because of plaintiff's failure to 
answer discovery (R. 72-74, 77, 110). The delay was 
entirely the responsibility and fault of plaintiff, who 
now cries "prejudice" and points to that delay as an ex-
cuse. Certainly a party should not be permitted to take 
advantage of it's own wrong. Plaintiff's claim of absence 
of a former employee is unfounded when we consider 
the testimony of Mills (plaintiff's agent) who stated 
that no particular individual handled the issuance of the 
bond and that there was no continuity in follow through 
and that three or four people from the Denver office 
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worked on the matter (R. 382-384); the claim of missing 
files is unfounded when we consider that the home office 
"had copies of everything" (R. 383) and that plaintiff had 
notice of the problems with the bonded project at an 
early date and destroyed files thereafter at it's peril. 
Plaintiff's claim of prejudice is that had it known 
of this defense earlier it might have been able to find 
evidence to overcome the defense if in fact any such evi-
dence in fact existed (which we deny). Plaintiff has not 
pointed to any specific evidence which if proven would 
entitle it to judgment against Butcher, but has simply 
speculated that such evidence might have existed and 
might now be unavailable due to passage of time. Such 
a speculation is insufficient to impose liability of over 
$44,000.00 upon Butchers who never were legally bound 
to plaintiff on any contract. The judgment should be 
reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Butchers never were liable to plaintiff under any 
contract in evidence in this case. It is undisputed that 
the indemnity agreement which they signed was void 
and unenforceable for lack of consideration. Plaintiff's 
claim that Butchers waived the absence of consideration 
defense by not pleading it (although they did not have 
facts which would justify such a pleading at the time 
that they answered the complaint), and that Butchers 
should not be permitted to amend their answer to con-
form to the evidence of absence of consideration pro-
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duced at the trial by plaintiff because of alleged pre-
judice resulting from delay of 5% years in bringing case 
to trial (which delay was solely the result of failure of 
plaintiff to prosecute and to answer Butchers' interroga-
tories), are unfounded. Plaintiff falsely alleged in it's 
complaint that the indemnity agreement was supported 
by consideration, without pleading dates from which 
that defense could be determined. 
Plaintiff failed to sustain it's burden of persuasion 
and of proof by itself introducing evidence which show-
ed that plaintiff was not entitled to recover against But-
chers. The bond was issued in reliance upon indemnity 
agreements from third parties and plaintiff was bound 
on the bond long before Butchers signed the indemnity 
agreement. Plaintiff is not entitled to a windfall by 
judgment against Butchers on an unenforceable contract. 
The judgment should be vacated and the case dismissed 
as to Butchers. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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